We theoretically study how commodity …nancialization a¤ects trading behavior, prices and welfare through a¤ecting risk sharing and price discovery in futures markets. In our model, the general equilibrium feature makes …nancial traders either provide or demand liquidity in the futures market, depending on the information environment. Consistent with recent evidence, commodity …nancialization reduces the futures price bias through broadening risk sharing and injecting information into the market. Each …nancial trader loses and …nal-end commodity consumers bene…t in the process of commodity …nancialization. Commercial hedgers can either lose or win, and their welfare improves with commodity …nancialization only when the number of active …nancial traders takes intermediate values.
Introduction
Historically, futures market was introduced for commodity producers (such as farmers) and demanders (such as manufacturers) to share later spot price risks and control costs. Over the past decade, particularly after the year of 2004, commodity futures have become a popular asset to …nancial investors, such as hedge funds and commodity index traders, and this process has been referred to as the …nancialization of commodity markets (Basak and Pavlova, 2014; . There is an emerging empirical literature that documents important facts about the trading behavior of …nancial traders in futures markets and the resulting pricing implications.
The fundamental role of futures market is to facilitate risk sharing and price discovery.
In this paper, we study how commodity …nancialization a¤ects these functions of futures markets and explore the resulting implications for trading behavior, prices of futures and commodity goods, and welfare of the relevant interest groups. Speci…cally, we aim to address the following questions: How does the trading of …nancial traders in the futures market a¤ect the behavior of later spot price? Are …nancial traders liquidity providers or liquidity demanders in the futures market? How does the presence of more …nancial traders a¤ect the futures price biases (i.e., the deviations of the future price from the expected later spot price)? How does it a¤ect the risk-sharing and price discovery roles of futures market? Who bene…t and who lose in the process of commodity …nancialization? Why and when? To answer these questions, some formal modeling is needed and our paper takes up this task.
We develop an asymmetric information model with one commodity good (labeled as "wheat") and two periods (t = 0 and 1). At date 1, there is a wheat spot market where a group of consumers who derive utility from wheat consumption trade against a group of commodity suppliers (labeled as "growers"). The resulting spot price is determined by two shocks, a demand shock~ built in consumers' preference and a supply shockc built in growers' production technology. Information is symmetric in the date-1 spot market.
At date 0, the growers and K …nancial traders trade contracts on the future delivery of the commodity. Commodity …nancialization is parameterized by the number K of …nancial traders active in the futures market. Both growers and …nancial traders are risk averse, and growers in the futures market represent commercial hedgers in reality. The futures market features asymmetric information: growers as wheat producers are informed of the supply side shockc, while …nancial traders have diverse private signals about the demand shock~ . This information structure enables us to capture the idea that …nancial traders can bring new information to the market, and that the more of this type of traders, the more information they bring in aggregate. Growers also make their real production decisions at date 0, through which we establish the real e¤ect of futures market on the later spot market.
We develop two sets of results, one on positive variables and the other on agents'welfare.
The positive implications concern the trading behavior of …nancial traders and the futures and spot prices of the commodity. First, we …nd that the general equilibrium feature can endogenously make …nancial traders either provide or demand liquidity in the futures market, depending on the information environment. Speci…cally, when …nancial traders have very accurate private information about the demand shock~ , their speculative trading motive is strong, and at this moment they tend to demand liquidity. By contrast, when the supply shockc is very volatile, growers' hedging motive is strong, and so they tend to demand liquidity, which in turn makes …nancial traders provide liquidity in equilibrium on the other side. In addition, we …nd that …nancial traders may change faces in the process of …nan-cialization. For instance, …nancial traders may switch from liquidity providers to demanders as there are more of them in the futures market. These results help to reconcile the mixed empirical evidence that …nancial traders both provide and demand liquidity in commodity futures market. 1 Second, we identify a supply channel through which the futures price a¤ects the later spot price (see equation (10) in Lemma 1). In growers' date-0 decision problem, because both the futures contract and their production technology expose them to the same source of risks, growers can e¤ectively treat the futures price as their wheat selling price in making production decisions. As a result, when the presence of more …nancial traders in futures 1 For instance, Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012) argue that their …nding is consistent with that …-ancancial traders as speculators provide liquidity. By contrast, according to Kang, Rouwenhorst and Tang (2014) , it is hedgers who provide liquidity to speculator in commodity futures market. Cheng, Kirilenko and Xiong (2014) document that …nancial traders can either provide or demand liquidity at di¤erent time periods, and in particular, during the recent crisis, …nancial traders reduced their commodity futures positions instead of facilitating the hedging needs of hedgers. market pushes up the futures price, growers will supply more commodities in the later spot market, which will drive down the spot price. This observation can be useful for understanding the recent decline in the crude oil price. Back to 2007-2008, the futures price was very high, toping $140 per barrel, due to the huge in ‡ow of …nancial traders. This increased futures price may have caused oil producers to develop more of those oil …elds with relatively high marginal costs. After a few years, these oil …elds have been fully developed and the new resulting oil wells start to operate, which leads to the oil glut nowadays, causing the price decline.
Third, we show that the futures market can either feature a normal backwardation (i.e., a downward bias in futures price relative to the expected value of the later spot price) or a contango (i.e., an upward bias in future price). When the average production cost is relatively low, a normal backwardation ensues, and otherwise, a contango follows. This is again related to the supply channel we discussed above: when the average production cost is low, growers tend to produce more wheat and therefore short more futures to hedge, thereby depressing the futures price. We then demonstrate that commodity …nancialization reduces the futures price bias through two e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is that more …nancial traders in the futures market can share the risk o¤-loaded by growers. The indirect e¤ect is that more …nancial traders bring more new information to the market, which, through the futures price, reduces the risks faced by all market participants. Consistent with our …nding, Hamilton and Wu (2014) have recently documented that the risk premium in crude oil futures on average decreased and became more volatile since 2005.
Our normative analysis yields insights on how commodity …nancialization a¤ects the welfare of consumers, …nancial traders, and particularly, growers (which correspond to commercial hedgers in the futures market in reality). First, we show that as more …nancial traders come to the futures market, the welfare of consumers increases, while the welfare of each individual …nancial trader decreases. Intuitively, the presence of more …nancial traders pushes the futures price up, which induces growers to supply more wheat at a lower price in the spot market, thereby bene…ting wheat consumers. Each …nancial trader loses in the process of commodity …nancialization simply because the presence of more …nancial traders reduces the futures price bias, which wipes potential trading opportunities that can be ex-plored by each …nancial trader as a speculator.
Second and more interestingly, we …nd that the welfare of growers improves with commodity …nancialization only when the number of …nancial traders active in the futures market takes intermediate values. In other words, growers' welfare …rst decreases, then increases, and …nally decreases again with the number of …nancial traders. This result is in contrast to the traditional view that adding more traders should bene…t hedgers through broader risk sharing. Our result arises from the interaction of two competing forces. The positive force is that more …nancial traders push up the futures price, and since the futures price is the e¤ective wheat selling price of growers, their pro…t from wheat production improves. The negative force comes from the fact that more …nancial traders also reduces the trading gains of growers in the futures market. This negative force is particularly strong when the number of …nancial traders is su¢ ciently small or su¢ ciently large. When there are not many traders in the market, the e¤ect of adding a new trader to share the risk is relatively large. When the number of …nancial traders is su¢ ciently large and when …nancial traders have private information, adding a new …nancial trader will cause all the existing traders to read better information from the price, and through this price discovery channel, the trading gain of each market participant can decrease a lot due to an e¤ect similar to Hirshleifer (1971) .
Our paper is broadly related to two strands of literature. The …rst is the recent growing literature on …nancialization of commodities. So far, this literature is largely empirical and it documents the trading behavior of …nancial traders in futures markets and their pricing impact.
2 The theoretical research is relatively scarce. Basak and Pavlova (2014) and Baker (2014) construct dynamic equilibrium models to study asset price dynamics. While their analyses o¤er important insights, their models feature symmetric information, which is therefore not suitable for our goal of analyzing how …nancialization a¤ects price discovery in futures markets. In addition, we consider some dimensions that their models do not (such as welfare implications) and their models consider some dimensions that we do not (such as return dynamics), and therefore, our analysis complements theirs.
Recently, Sockin and Xiong (2014) and Goldstein, Li and Yang (2014) also develop asymmetric information models to explore the implications of the …nancialization of commodity 2 See Irwin and Sanders (2011) and for excellent surveys.
futures markets. Our paper and those studies complement each other in many important dimensions. Sockin and Xiong (2014) focus on information asymmetry in the spot market, and their main theory insight is that a high spot price may further spur the commodity demand through an informational channel, which may therefore fuel a short-term bubble in spot prices. In contrast, our analysis focuses on information asymmetry in futures market and the real e¤ect on spot prices is through a supply channel in our setting. Goldstein, Li and Yang (2014) emphasize that in the futures market, because …nancial institutions are limited to trade in the futures contracts for speculation purposes, while commodities producers trade the futures contracts mostly for hedging, these two groups of traders they may respond to the same information in opposite directions. This can lead to a reduction in price informativeness and an increase in the futures risk premium. By contrast, in our setting, …nancial institutions and commodities producers observe di¤erent information, and commodity …nancialization always reduces the futures price biases. Moreover, we have provided both positive and normative analyses, while Sockin and Xiong (2014) and Goldstein, Li and Yang (2014) mainly focus on pricing implications.
Our paper is also related to the classic literature on futures market. 3 This literature has developed theories of "hedging pressure" (Keynes, 1930; Hirshleifer, 1988 Hirshleifer, , 1990 or "storage" (Kaldor, 1939; Working, 1949) to explain futures prices. Notably, the literature has also developed asymmetric information models on futures market (e.g., Grossman, 1977; Danthine, 1978; Bray, 1981; Stein, 1987) . However, because commodity …nancialization is just a recent phenomenon, these models have focused on di¤erent research questions, for instance, on whether the futures market is viable (Grossman, 1977) , on whether the futures price is fully revealing (Danthine, 1978; Bray, 1981) , and on whether speculative trading can reduce welfare (Stein, 1987) .
Among these models, Stein (1987) is closest in terms of research topics, but his analysis concerns the comparison between an economy with futures and an economy without, and he shows that introducing a new asset can harm welfare by generating price volatility. However, he does not explore the general implications of …nancialization for risk sharing and price discovery, such as the e¤ect on the trading behavior of …nancial traders. Also, his model features an endowment economy, while our setup has commodity production, which is crucial for many of our results. In terms of model setup, our model is closer to Danthine (1978) . His main …nding is that the futures price provides a su¢ cient statistics used by rational traders in formulating their probability distributions. The futures price is not fully revealing in our setup, because we have introduced two sources of uncertainty, similar to Bray (1981) and . In addition, our analysis has focused on topics emphasized by the recent empirical literature on …nancialization of commodities.
The Model
We consider an asymmetric information model similar to Grossman (1977) , Danthine (1978) and Stein (1987) to study the implications of commodity …nancialization. There are two consumption goods-a commodity good (call it wheat) and a numeraire good (call it money)-and two tradable assets, a futures contract on the commodity and a risk-free asset (with the net risk-free rate normalized at zero). Time lasts two periods: t = 0 and 1. At date 0, K 2 N …nancial investors, such as hedge funds or commodity index traders, trade futures contracts against J 2 N commodity producers (call them growers). Here we use parameter K to capture …nancialization of commodities, that is, the process of commodity …nancial-ization corresponds to an increase in K. 4 At date 0, growers also make their investment on the commodity production, which in turn determines the commodity supply at the date-1 spot market. At date 1, J 2 N consumers purchase commodity from the spot market, and all agents consume and exit the economy. 5 The timeline of the economy is summarized in Figure 1 . We next describe in detail the behavior and information structure of each type of agents.
4 Alternatively, we can follow Hirshleifer (1988) and assume that it costs ' > 0 for a …nancial trader to participate in the futures market to endogenize the number K of …nancial traders active in the futures market. In this augmented setting, an increase in K can be interpreted as a decrease in '.
5 For simplicity, we have assumed that the number of consumers and the number of growers are the same. This assumption is just a normalization and it is without loss of generality.
Consumers
There are J > 0 identical consumers. At date 1, a representative consumer derives utility from the two consumption goods according to the following Marshallian quasi-linear utility function:
where y is the wheat consumption, m is the left-over money, and~ denotes a preference shock which follows a normal distribution with a mean of 2 R and a precision (the inverse of variance) of > 0 (i.e.,~ N ; 1= ). 6 Consumers know their preference shock~ and the spot priceṽ when they make their consumption choice, which di¤ers from Sockin and
Xiong (2014) whose analysis emphasizes the information inference problem in commodity demanders'decisions.
Preference shock~ can also be interpreted as a technology shock. For instance, consumers do not directly consume wheat, and they have to transform wheat into bread according to a concave technology, B = 1 2 y 2 +~ y, where B is the bread output and y is the wheat input.
Then, preference (1) follows directly. We are agonistic about both interpretations and the key is that~ represents demand shocks in the commodity spot market. We also follow Stein (1987) and assume that consumers do not trade in the futures market back at date 0.
The behavior of consumers generates the commodity demand in the spot market. Their e¤ective role in the model is to provide a parsimonious device that determines the wheat spot price. Speci…cally, letṽ denote the spot price of wheat and normalize each consumer's initial endowment at 0. Then, a representative consumer's problem is
which yields the following wheat demand function of each consumer:
Accordingly, the aggregate wheat demand is J y = J ~ ṽ . Note that the spot pricẽ v is also a random variable, whose distribution will be endogenously derived in subsequent sections.
6 Throughout the paper, we use a tilde (~) to signify a random variable, where a bar denotes its mean and denotes its precision. That is, for a random variablez, we have z E (z) and z = 1 V ar(z) .
Growers
There are J > 0 identical growers who only consume the numeraire good. We make growers risk averse to introduce their hedging motives. Speci…cally, a representative grower has a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility with a risk aversion coe¢ cient of > 0; that is, his utility function is U G (W ) = e W , where W is his …nal wealth at the end of date 1. Growers make decisions at date 0 and these decisions are twofold. First, they decide how much wheat to produce, which will in turn determine the wheat supply at the date-1 spot market. Second, they decide how many futures to invest in the futures market in order to both hedge their wheat production and to speculate on their private information that is introduced shortly.
Consider a representative grower. If he decides to produce x units of wheat, he needs to pay a production cost
where the cost shockc N ( c; 1= c ) (with c > 0) is independent of the demand shock . The cost function (3) is convex in x. The cost shockc is growers'private information.
We introduce this shock for two reasons. First, it is empirically relevant that commodity producers indeed have valuable private information when they trade futures. Second, later on, we will allow …nancial traders to possess private information on~ , and by doing so, we will have a structure that …nancial traders and growers possess di¤erent information, so that the interactions between these two dimensional information can endogenously make …nancial traders either provide or demand liquidity in equilibrium.
The representative grower also participates in the futures market. The payo¤ on the futures contract is the wheat spot priceṽ at date 1. Each unit of futures contract is traded at an endogenous pricep. This price is observable to all market participants and it contains valuable information. So, the grower's information set is I G fc;pg. His decision is to 7 The cost function C (x) can be alternatively interpreted as an inventory cost. For instance, suppose that the date-0 wheat spot price is v 0 and carrying an inventory of x units of wheat incurs a cost ofcx + 1 2 x 2 . Then the total cost of storing x units of wheat is C (x) = (c + v 0 ) x + 1 2 x 2 , which is essentially equation (3) with a renormalization of the mean ofc. However, this interpretation is made in a partial equilibrium setting since the date-0 spot price v 0 is exogenous. We can fully endogenize this spot price as well at the expense of introducing one extra source of uncertainty, because otherwise the prices of futures and current spot price will jointly fully reveal the shocks (see Grossman, 1977) . choose wheat production x and futures investment d G (and investment in the risk-free asset)
to maximize
where we have normalized grower's initial endowment as 0.
Remark 1 To better connect our setup to previous models, we have followed the literature (e.g., Danthine, 1978) and interpreted growers as commodity suppliers. In e¤ect, a more precise interpretation of growers should be commercial hedgers, because as become clear later, their futures demand contains a hedging component (see equation (12)). In this sense, growers can be either commodity providers or commodity demanders. Speci…cally, if x < 0, then in equation (5) the termṽx cx 1 2 x 2 can be interpreted as the quasi-linear utility from consuming x units of wheat, and so growers are wheat demanders. We can also extend the model to have multiple growers who receive di¤erent cost shocks, so that in equilibrium some growers supply wheat while others demand wheat. We abstract from this extension for simplicity. Relatedly, the essential role of consumers in our model is to provide a residual wheat demand function to determine the spot priceṽ. To see this, note that growers' information set does not include the later spot priceṽ and thus their decisions on wheat production x does not depend onṽ (see equation (9)). Therefore, we use consumers' wheat demand to bringṽ into the market clearing condition of the spot market. In this sense, consumers may be better interpreted as those parties in reality who deal with physical commodities but do not participate in futures market, such as some airline companies.
Financial traders
There are K 0 …nancial traders who derive utility only from their consumption of the numeraire good at date 1. They have a CARA utility with a risk aversion coe¢ cient of > 0.
Financial traders trade futures only for speculation, not for hedging any real production of commodities. To capture the fact that …nancial traders can bring new information to the market, we assume that they have private information about the demand shock~ in the later spot market (recall that growers have private information about the supply shockc).
In addition, we assume that …nancial traders have di¤erent private information to implement the notion that as more …nancial traders come to the market, they bring more information in aggregate. Speci…cally, at date 0, before trading a …nancial trader k receives a private signals k =~ +" k with" k N (0; 1= " ) and " 0;
where" k is independent of each other and of other random variables. Parameter " controls the quality of their private signals. We allow the possibility of " = 0 which corresponds to the case that …nancial traders do not have private information at all.
Financial traders also observe the future pricep, and thus …nancial trader k has an information set I F;k fs k ;pg. His decision problem is to choose date-0 …nancial investments in futures and the risk-free asset to maximize the conditional expected utility. Speci…cally, let d F;k be the futures demand of …nancial trader k, and his decision problem is
where we have also normalized the initial endowment of …nancial traders to be zero. For simplicity, we have assumed that …nancial traders do not trade other assets such as stocks.
As long as the payo¤s of other assets are independent of futures payo¤, our results will not change even if more assets are introduced into the economy. However, if the payo¤s are correlated across assets, then …nancial traders may trade futures also for hedging motives, which will complicate the analysis signi…cantly. We do not expect this modi…cation changes the main results of the paper.
Equilibrium Characterization
An equilibrium in our economy consists of two subequilibria: the spot market equilibrium at date 1 and the futures market equilibrium at date 0. Intuitively, at date 1, consumers maximize their preference, yielding the wheat demand function, which in turn clears the wheat supply provided by growers at the prevailing spot priceṽ. Because the wheat demand depends on the demand shock~ and the wheat supply depends on cost shockc and futures pricep, the spot priceṽ is expected to be a function of ~ ;c;p . At date 0, there is a competitive rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in the futures market. Given growers have private informationc and …nancial traders have private information fs k g K k=1 , the futures pricep is expected to depend on (c;s 1 ; :::;s K ); that is, there is a futures price function p (c;s 1 ; :::;s K ). Growers and …nancial traders extract information from observingp as well as their own private information to maximize their utility at the prevailing price.
Formally, an equilibrium is de…ned as follows. 
We next construct an equilibrium in which the price functions v ~ ;c;p and p (c;s 1 ; :::;s K ) are linear. As standard in the literature, we solve the equilibrium backward from date 1.
Date-1 spot market equilibrium
The wheat demand is given by equation (2), y =~ ṽ. The wheat supply is determined by growers'date-0 investment decisions. Solving growers'problem (given by (4) and (5)) yields the following …rst-order conditions:
x =p c:
The above expressions are similar to those in Danthine (1978) . The intuition is as follows.
Given both real investment x and …nancial investment d G expose a grower to the same risk sourceṽ, his overall exposure to this risk is given by the standard demand function of a CARA-investor, as expressed in (8). Expression (9) says that since the grower can sell his wheat at the futures pricep (after controlling the total risk given by (8)), he essentially treatsp as the wheat selling price when making real production decisions. Aggregating (9) across all growers delivers the aggregate wheat supply at the spot market: J x = J (p c).
By the market clearing condition J y = J x , y = x and equations (2) and (9), we can solve the spot priceṽ, which is given by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The date-1 spot priceṽ is given bỹ v =~ +c p.
3.2 Date-0 futures market equilibrium
We conjecture the following futures price function:
where p 0 , p c and p s are undetermined coe¢ cients. Next, we compute the demand function of futures market participants and use the market clearing condition to construct such a linear REE price function.
By (8) and (9), growers'demand for futures is
Growers trade futures for two reasons. First, they hedge their real commodity production of x =p c. Second, because they also have private information on their production costc, they speculate on this private information. Given that growers' information set is I G fc;pg, they can use the price function (11) to back out signalS (provided p s 6 = 0), which provides information about the demand component~ in the later spot priceṽ. Thus, growers'conditional forecast is
Solving …nancial trader k's problem in (7), we can compute his futures demand as follows:
Clearly, …nancial trader k trades only for speculating on information I F;k fs k ;pg. Provided p c 6 = 0 (which is true in equilibrium), the pricep is equivalent to the following signal in predictingṽ:s
Using Bayes'law, we can compute his forecast as follows:
where
Using the market clearing condition,
and the expressions of the demand functions, and comparing coe¢ cients, we can establish the following proposition regarding the existence and uniqueness of REE in the date-0 futures market.
Proposition 1 There exists a linear REE where the futures pricep and spot priceṽ are given respectively byp
v =~ +c p;
k and the coe¢ cients p 0 , p s 0 and p c > 0 are given in the appendix. The equilibrium is characterized by
, with being determined by
Moreover, if growers'risk aversion coe¢ cient is su¢ ciently small, then the equilibrium is unique within the linear price function class.
Trading and Pricing Implications 4.1 Liquidity providers and demanders
The empirical literature on commodity …nancialization …nds that …nancial traders can either provide liquidity or demand liquidity in the futures market (see Cheng, Kirilenko and Xiong, 2014; Kang, Rouwenhorst and Tang, 2014 Intuitively, if a trader demands liquidity, then it is very likely that he initiates the trade.
Thus, if he wants to buy the asset, he has to o¤er a price high enough to attract the other side to engage in the trade. Similarly, if he wants to sell the asset, then he has to sell it at a su¢ ciently low price to convince the other side to buy in the asset. As a result, a liquidity demander's equilibrium order ‡ow tends to be positively correlated with the equilibrium asset price. By the same token, a liquidity suppler's order ‡ow tends to be negatively correlated with the equilibrium price. Given that …nancial traders trade against growers in our economy, it must be the case that when …nancial traders provide liquidity, growers demand liquidity, and vice versa.
In our model, the general equilibrium feature endogenously makes …nancial traders admit either the role of liquidity demanders or of suppliers, depending on the information environment. Loosely speaking, …nancial traders tend to demand liquidity when the precision " of their private information is high and/or when the precision c of the cost shock is high, and they tend to supply liquidity when the opposite is true. The intuition is as follows. First, …nancial traders speculate on their private informations k , and so if their information is very precise (i.e., if " is very high), they will trade aggressively, and as a result, their order ‡ows will more likely move prices in the same direction. That is, …nancial traders demand liquidity when " is high. Second, growers trade futures both for hedging and for speculation, where the strength of their trading motives is captured by the variance indicates the values of of ( " ; c ) for which …nancial traders supply liquidity. Indeed, we …nd that …nancial traders tend to demand liquidity when either " or c is high, and they tend to provide liquidity when the opposite is true. Thus, our analysis shows that …nancial traders can either demand or provide liquidity depending on the information environment, even when …nancial traders always behave as speculators in futures market (that is, their demand function (15) does not have a hedging component). This is in sharp contrast to the literature which typically relies on …nancial traders'hedging need, say due to portfolio concerns, to make them become liquidity demanders (e.g., Cheng, Kirilenko and Xiong, 2014; Kang, Rouwenhorst and Tang, 2014) . The result of Figure 3 can be understood as follows. Given that the qualitative di¤erence between Panels A and B happens when K is large, we consider the limiting case of K ! 1.
In the limit, the average signalS
k !~ , and thus growers perfectly know~ and c. As a result, their trade must force the futures pricep to fully revealṽ, that is,p =ṽ =~ +c 2 , where the second equality follows from equation (10). Since the price is close to be fully revealing, the speculation component in d G (c;p) is close to d F (s k ;p) except for the di¤erent risk aversion coe¢ cients. Thus, the market clearing condition implies
As a consequence, we have 
Futures price biases
The literature has looked at "futures price bias," that is, the deviation of the futures price from the expectation of the later spot price, E (ṽ p). A downward bias in the futures price is termed "normal backwardation,"while an upward bias in the futures price is termed "contango." A major branch of literature on futures pricing has attributed bias to hedging pressures of commodity producers. Hamilton and Wu (2014) In the appendix, we show that the futures price bias E (ṽ p) is given as follows:
Parameter A is a normalized capacity of the market to absorb risks. To see this, note that by the demand functions (12) and (15) By equations (23) and (24), we have E (ṽ p) > 0 if and only if c < . This result is intuitive. When the average cost shock c is low, growers tend to produce more wheat and thus they will short more futures to hedge their wheat production, thereby depressing the futures price. But this result is non-trivial, becausec a¤ects both the futures pricep and the later spot priceṽ in the same direction (see Proposition 1). The key observation is thatc a¤ectsp more thanṽ. Fama and French (1987) used 21 commodities to test the futures risk premium hypothesis, and indeed, they found that some markets feature "normal backwardation," while others feature "contango." According to our theory, this di¤erence can be explained by the relative sizes of the average supply shock and the average demand shock.
Increasing the number K of …nancial traders tends to decrease futures price bias, that is, @jE(ṽ p)j @K < 0, which is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Hamilton and Wu (2014) . This is because the market's aggregate risk bearing capacity A may increase with K through two channels. First, the newly added …nancial traders directly share the risk that is loaded o¤ from the hedging needs of growers. Second, since …nancial traders can bring more information into the market, other existing market participants also learn more information about the futures payo¤ from reading the futures price, which e¤ectively reduces the payo¤ risks faced by the market.
Similarly, we can show
and thus, parameter K also a¤ects the average futures price E (p) and the average spot price E (ṽ) through its e¤ect on the capacity A of the market to absorb risks. When > c, growers need to hedge a lot of their wheat production so that the e¤ective futures supply is high, the average futures price E (p) increases with the risk absorption capacity A. Due to the increased average futures price, the average spot price E (ṽ) = + c E (p) decreases with A. When < c, the opposite is true.
Summarizing the above discussions yields the following proposition. Since June 2014, the crude oil price has kept declining from more than $110 per barrel down to about $50 per barrel, a more than 50% plunge. Many observers believe that this falling price is predominantly a supply e¤ect. 8 As we know, it takes time to search and develop oil …elds. It is plausible that back to 2007-2008, commodity …nancialization has pushed oil futures price way too high, with its peak close to $140 per barrel, and oil producers may have started to develop too many oil …elds in which they would not invest otherwise. A few years later, these oil …elds are fully developed and the new resulting oil wells generate excess oil supply, which is responsible for the price decline in the current oil market.
5 Welfare Implications
Welfare computations
We use the date-0 ex ante expected utility to represent the welfare of each group of agents.
For consumers, we insert their date-1 wheat demand function (2) into their preference expression (1) and use the equilibrium spot price (10) to obtain consumers' date-1 indirect utility as follows:Ũ
Recall that the wheat supply is given by x =p c in equation (9), and thus consumers'date-1 indirect utility is quadratic in the equilibrium wheat supply. This makes sense, given that consumers'preference is quasi-linear and they have to consume wheat in equilibrium. Taking expectation overŨ C;1 yields consumers'date-0 expected utility (or certainty equivalent given that their preference is linear in money consumption and thus they are risk neutral) as follows:
For …nancial traders, we can compute their indirect utility after trading as g
which is essentially the trading gains captured by …nancial traders in the futures market conditional on the realizations of the futures pricep and the private signals k . Then, an argument similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) shows that the date-0 certainty equivalent before the realizations ofp ands k is
This expression is intuitive. The …rst term is the certainty equivalent that a trader can obtain without making demands dependent on the equilibrium price or any private information, where the numerator [E (ṽ p)] 2 captures the potential gains due to the deviations between futures price and later payo¤ and the denominator 2 V ar (ṽ p) captures the risk in trading.
This term represents the trading gains due to the market making role of …nancial traders. The second term in (29) represents the additional bene…t from trading with superior information (i.e., the bene…t associated with the speculation role of …nancial traders), where V ar (ṽ p)
is the benchmark risk when there is no information, while V ar (ṽjI F;k ) is the reduced risk due to the additional information in futures pricep and the private signals k .
Similarly, we can compute the indirect utility of growers after trading and production as follows:
where the …rst term captures the trading gains from participating in the futures market, while the second term is the expected pro…t from producing wheat, with the expectation being taken after the realizations of the futures pricep and the private informationc. We can also compute the date-0 ex ante certainty equivalent before the realizations ofp andc as follows:
where I is the 2 2 identity matrix, and
;
Again, in (31), the …rst term captures the certainty equivalent that a grower can obtain without making decisions based on private informationc and the futures pricep, while the second term is the extra bene…t from speculating on superior information.
Symmetric information economies: The role of risk sharing
We now set " = 0, so that the presence of more …nancial traders in the futures market simply adds more market participants without adding new information to the market. In this case, …nancial traders can infer the private informationc owned by growers, so that the futures market features symmetric information. Since no information on~ is brought into the market, the variations in futures pricep are fully driven by the variations in the costc of the wheat production technology. In this limiting economy, we can compute the welfare expressions analytically, which are given in the appendix.
Consumers'welfare increases with the number K of …nancial traders. Intuitively, when more …nancial traders participate in the futures market, they help to share the risk and push up the futures pricep. Since the futures price is the e¤ective wheat selling price from the eyes of growers, they produce more wheat in equilibrium. As a result, consumers can consume more wheat at a cheaper price in the date-1 spot market, and their welfare improves.
The welfare of each …nancial trader decreases with the number K of …nancial traders in the futures market for two reasons. First, as more …nancial traders participate in the market, they bring down the futures price bias [E (ṽ p)] 2 by Proposition 3, and thus, the …rst term in (29), which corresponds to the trading gains without information, will decrease. Second, the second term in (29) also decreases with K, because more …nancial traders, who have the same information as growers, also bring the pricep closer to its payo¤ṽ, which e¤ectively reduces V ar (ṽ p).
The e¤ect of commodity …nancialization on the welfare of growers is ambiguous: increasing K will bene…t growers if and only if there are a su¢ ciently large number of …nancial traders. This is in contrast to our conventional wisdom that expanding the traders base would bene…t growers (as hedgers) through more risk sharing in the market. We can demonstrate the intuition most clearly by examining equation (30), which is the indirect utility g CE G;1 post trading and production. We also set c = 1 so thatc = c. By so doing, we essentially remove the randomness in the futures pricep, and thus g CE G;1 = CE G;0 . We can show that increasing K a¤ects the two terms of (30),
. First, when there are more …nan-cial traders, they can share the risk loaded o¤ by growers, thereby increasing the futures pricẽ p and the pro…t 1 2 (p c) 2 made by growers. Second, the presence of more …nancial traders also lowers the futures price bias, which therefore reduces the trading gains
. This second negative e¤ect dominates when there are not many …nancial traders in the market and so the futures bias is initially large.
Interestingly, we can also show that the dominance of the negative e¤ect on growers'
welfare only arises in our production economy where growers make real investment decisions.
In contrast, in an endowment economy where growers are given with an exogenous amount of commodities, increasing the number of …nancial traders always bene…ts growers. That is, the negative e¤ect is stronger in our production economy. This is because when the futures pricep increases due to the added …nancial traders, growers also supply more wheat in the later spot price, which therefore also endogenously changes the payo¤ on the futures contract, making the decrease in the futures price bias particularly severe.
We summarize the above discussions in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose " = 0.
(a) Increasing the number K of …nancial traders bene…ts consumers and harms …nancial traders. That is, 
Asymmetric information economies:
The role of price discovery Now we allow " > 0, so that the futures market participation of …nancial traders also brings new information about the demand shock~ into the market. We …nd that this new feature mainly changes the implication for growers'welfare. Because of the complexity of the welfare expressions, it is di¢ cult to establish analytical results. We therefore use a numerical example to illustrate our analysis. We have tried numerous parameter con…gurations and found that the pattern we identi…ed is quite robust.
In Figure 5 , we choose parameter values similar to those in previous …gures. That is, growers' welfare CE G;0 …rst decreases and then increases with K. Now when " > 0, we …nd that CE G;0 …rst decreases, then increases, but …nally decreases again with K. This suggests that the negative welfare e¤ect on the trading gains is particularly strong when either K is small or K is large. The intuition for the case of small K is still the same as before, that is, when there are not many …nancial traders in the market, the futures bias can be large, leaving a large room for it to decline. Now, when " > 0, recall that …nancial traders bring information to the market. Thus, when there are many …nancial traders who infer information from prices, a newly added …nancial trader will cause all these traders to reform their forecast, and after aggregating their trading, the price can reveal a lot more information. This price discovery process will hurt the growers' trading gains through a channel similar to the Hirshleifer e¤ect (1970) . That is, more …nancial traders bring more information about the payo¤ on the futures payo¤, thereby destroying the potential trading gains that can be captured by market participants.
Panels B and C of Figure 5 suggest that commodity …nancialization still bene…ts consumers and harms …nancial traders. The aforementioned price discovery e¤ect also adversely a¤ects …nancial traders. However, since when " = 0, the welfare of each …nancial trader has already declined with K, the extra negative e¤ect due to price discovery only strengthens this pattern and will not change the direction. Given that the welfare CE F;0 of each …nancial trader declines with K, if there is a market participation cost ' > 0 for …nancial traders to participate in the futures market, then the number K of …nancial traders active in the market can be uniquely pinned down by setting CE F;0 = '. This echoes the argument made in our previous footnote 4. Also note that here it is the welfare of each individual …nancial trader that decreases with K. As a group, …nancial traders'aggregate welfare K CE F;0 actually …rst increases and then decreases with K.
Conclusion
In the past decade, there is a sharp increase in the in ‡ow of …nancial investors into commodity futures markets, which is labelled as the …nancialization of commodities. In this paper, we develop a model to study the implications of this phenomenon for trading behavior, asset prices and welfare through the lens of risk sharing and price discovery. We …nd that in the futures market, …nancial traders, as speculators, can either provide liquidity to or demand liquidity from other market participants such as commercial hedgers, depending on the information environment. Commodity …nancialization helps to reduce futures price bias, not only because …nancial traders help to share risk, but also because they bring new information to the market, which reduces the risk faced by all market participants. Commodity …nan-cialization generally harms …nancial traders and bene…ts the …nal end consumers. Unlike the conventional wisdom that argues that commercial hedgers bene…t from the presence of more market participants, commercial hedgers can actually lose in the process of commodity …nancialization, because more …nancial traders active in the futures market also reduces the trading gains of commercial hedgers through bringing down the futures price bias.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
In order to get equation (22) . Thus, we have: 
Plugging the expressions of F;s and V ar (ṽjs k ;p) into the above expression yields (22).
Examining equation (22), we …nd that when = 0, the RHS is positive, and that when ! 1, the RHS is …nite. Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a solution 2 (0; 1) to equation (22) . In e¤ect, we can further narrow down the range of as h
. To see this, suppose > The numerator of the above expression is quadratic and it is downward sloping for
. In addition, this quadratic numerator is negative at = K " +K "
. Note that in equilibrium, 2
, and thus, when is su¢ ciently small, < 0 for all 2
. As a result, the RHS of (A1) is downward sloping in , while its RHS is upward sloping. Therefore, uniqueness is established.
Finally, using the market clearing condition, we can compute the expressions of p 0 ; p s and p c as follows: (14) and (17), we can express A as follows:
Suppose " > 0. Then, when is small, the derivative 
